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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RELIABLE FURNITURE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., 
WESTERN GENERAL AGENCY, and 
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11656 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The brief filed by Respondents raises points not covered 
by the Judgment of the trial court (R-34) or the Brief of 
Appellant. Accordingly, we feel it essential to file this reply 
brief to meet such arguments. 
POINT 1. 
NEGOTIATION OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT 
As Appellant pointed out in its first brief, page 6, re-
lease is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and has 
not been pleaded by any Respondent in this case. Now, in 
Respondent's brief we are faced with another affirmative 
defense not pleaded-accord and satisfaction (page 12, Re-
spondent's brief). 
Utah cases have steadfastly held the doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction to be an affirmative defense that must be 
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pleaded. Rule 8, (c) U.R.C.P. F.M.A. Financial Corporation v 
Build, 17 U. 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, ( 1965), Hintze vs Seaich, 
20 U. 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202 (1968). 
The endorsement and negotiation of a check bearing a 
release statement does not constitute a release, or accord and 
satisfaction as a matter of law. Dillman v Massey Ferguson, 
Inc. 13 U. 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962). In that case a check 
was delivered with an accompanying letter stating it repre-
sented "the amount due in full to complete recent buy-back 
on your account". Under the facts of that case, a further suit 
as to matters between the parties was not barred. 
In Bennett v Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 18 U. 2d 186, 
417 P.2d 761, (1966), there was a dispute between employer 
and employee as to commissions due. The employee endorsed 
and negotiated a check with the wording "Payment in full 
of the account stated below-Endorsement of check by payee 
is sufficient receipt." This language did not constitute a re-
lease, or accord and satisfaction, since the employee disputed 
the amount as payment in full. 
Hintze vs Seaich, supra, involved yet another dispute 
between employer and employee as to commissions due. The 
employee endorsed and cashed a check with this language 
on it: "This is the balance of your account in full." A finding 
of the trial court that this did not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction (or release) was upheld by this court. 
Respondent's brief (page 13) anticipates an argument that 
payment of an undisputed amount due will support a release 
for a disputed amount. It cites Williston to support 
this argument. However, it ignores the fact that this 
court has ruled just the opposite, namely, that payment of 
a lesser undisputed sum will not release the debtor from a 
claim to a larger disputed amount. See F.M.A. Financial 
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Corporation vs Build, supra, and Reliable Furniture Co. vs 
Fidelity and Guaranty Inc. Underwriters, 16 U. 2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685 (1965). 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO RATIFICATION OF THE EVENTS OF 
JUNE 19 BY THE ACTION OF SAM HERSCOVITZ. 
At the outset, "ratification" would appear to be another 
designation for the doctrine of "waiver"; and although not 
specifically set out in 8 (c), U.R.C.P., it is an affirmative 
defense that must be pleaded. It has never been pleaded by 
any defendant. 
In Respondent's brief, certain Utah cases are cited in 
support of this point and criticism leveled at Purvis vs Penn 
R. Co., 198 F.2d 631 (3rd C.C.A. 1952) as inapplicable. A brief 
review will show Purvis to be much closer factually than any 
of the citations of Respondent. 
The first authority, 77 ALR 2 Page 427, states a general 
rule as to ratification. This same annotation, at Page 434, 
describes an essential element of ratification, intention: 
"While a contract voidable for duress may be rati-
fied, either by express consent, or by conduct in-
consistent with any other hypothesis than that of 
approval, still the intention to ratify is an essential 
element and is at the foundation of the doctrine of 
waiver or ratification." 
Again, at page 449 it is stated: 
"Lack of intention to ratify has also been held to 
preclude a finding of ratification." 
The facts in our present case, viewed (as they must be) 
favorably to plaintiff, reveal anything but an intention to 
ratify. 
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The testimony was that Herscovitz believed, when he en-
dorsed and deposited the draft, that he was not concluding 
the claim against American. R-140, 141. He flatly denied any 
intention to ratify, R-141 line 21: 
"Q. And by so doing, you intended to be paid for 
any claim arising out of the business interrup-
tion loss, didn't you? 
A. Absolutely no intent whatsoever." 
This testimony is supported by his objections to the size 
of the settlement to Jack Day, (R-137, 210), his immediate 
call to Mr. Holmes, his insurance agent (R-104) and consul-
tation with counsel (R-106), his holding the draft for eight 
or nine days (R-106) and his immediate filing of suit on Au-
gust 11, 1961 (R-1). 
The next authority Respondent presents is State vs Bar-
low, .107 U.292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944). The factual background 
of that case is a bigamy prosecution; the defendant claimed 
Utah anti-poligamy laws were the result of duress and coer-
cion from the federal government It is indeed difficult to 
see its applicability to the present case. 
Next Respondent offers Farrington vs Granite Stake Fire 
Insurance Co., 120 U. 109, 232 P.2d 754 (1951). This case 
upheld a jury verdict against an insurer. The plea of ratifi-
cation, or waiver, was (page 118) "* * * not controlling in 
the case." The issue was not determined as a matter of law, 
as Respondent seeks to do in our case. Factually the case is 
far different from ours, as the attempted recission was first 
made over one year following the fire and knowledge of all 
the facts. 
LeVine vs Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 105 P.2d (1910), 
did not deal with waiver or ratification as a matter of law, 
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but as one of fact. Delay in claiming fraud for 11 months after 
discovery of it, without protest, supported a finding of ratifi-
cation. 
Next cited is Taylor v. Moore, 87 U.493, 51 P.2d 222 
(1935). The holding was simply that a purchaser of lands 
who delayed any attempt to rescind for nearly 3 years after 
learning of the fraud was not entitled to rescind. He was, 
however, entitled to a jury trial on the question of damages 
resulting from the fraud. 
The final authority Respondent relies on here is McKellar 
Real Estate v. Paxton,, 62 U. 97, 218 P. 128 (1923). This case 
holds a purchaser of real property cannot keep the land 
and rescind the contract. It is difficult to argue with this hold-
ing, but it does not appear relevant here. 
It may be that Respondents would prevail with a jury 
verdict on the issue of ratification. The jury could indeed find 
that Sam Herscovitz intended to ratify the $12,900 settle-
ment and is bound thereby. If a jury so found, we would have 
no quarrel if the evidence is sufficient to support such a 
finding. But clearly, the evidence is not sufficient to rule as 
a matter of law that ratification was accomplished. As was 
stated in Purvis, the entire transaction and surrounding cir-
cumstances must be considered, not simply the fact of en-
dorsement of a draft at a particular time and place. Any rea-
sonable look at the evidence will show there is a jury ques-
tion to be resolved on the issue of ratification. 
Respondent raises a number of questions in its Brief, 
all centering on the question of what "compelled" Reliable 
to endorse and negotiate the draft when it did. These are 
fair questions to put to Herscovitz, and to argue the answers 
forthcoming to the jury. But this approach completely misses 
the thrust of the complaint itself. What is the distinction be-
5 
tween the present case, and a hypothetical one where the 
person seeking relief had been paid in cash and retained it 
for 9 days (or some other figure) without further protest? 
In our case, Reliable v. Fidelity & Guaranty, 16 U.2d 211, 
398 P.2d 685 (1965) has ruled that tender of the money is 
not essential to the maintenance of this suit. Is there a magic 
difference, then, between pocketing the proceeds of the set-
tlement immediately or in holding it for 9 days? In either 
case, tender has not been made prior to suit, and the time 
question is simply one for the jury. 
It should be remembered that Reliable desperately need-
ed money during this period. Also, to get the stock loss pay-
ment, Herscovitz had to sign a proof of loss for $12,900 on 
the business interruption loss. True, the proof of loss was 
not a receipt, but it was a statement under oath that would 
certainly be used against him in any further attempt to re-
cover his actual loss. Under these circumstances, his action 
in holding the draft for 9 days is just of the facts to be 
reviewed on the question of release, not the controlling fact 
as a matter of law. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD. 
Respondent gives lip service to the rule that. evidence 
must be reviewed favorably to the party suffering from an 
involuntary dismissal, but in fact recites disputed facts fav-
orable to his position. 
Appellant's brief sets out specifically the elements of 
fraud and the facts relied upon to support that claim. Respon-
dent's brief attacks the evidence supporting the element of 
reliance. Herscovitz testified he relied upon the misrepresen-
tations of Day and Ball (R-138): 
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"Q. So you didn't rely on what he said at all as 
having any bearing in any way? 
A. Of course I did." 
Also, at (R-102): 
"Q. Did you sign this Proof of Loss, Mr. Hersco-
vitz, on the business interruption claim? 
A. At approximately six-thirty I reconciled myself 
that I had to sign it if I was going to get the 
draft for the inventory." 
To attempt to counter this by saying Herscovitz was 
aware of his rights (Respondent's brief page 21) is mean-
ingless. He knew what they were doing was wrong, but he 
certainly believed (and relied upon) what they told him. Re-
spondent seems to assume that since Herscovitz realized they 
were acting improperly he must therefore have known the 
statements made were false. This is patently wrong! Just 
because something is improper does not mean it is not a fact. 
When the general agent for American and Fidelity told Her-
scovitz the companies' position, Herscovitz of course believed 
that is in fact what it was. Any reasonable person would. Nor 
does his consultation with counsel contradict this evidence. 
Advice from counsel as to what the companies could legally 
and properly do in no way changes Herscovitz' reliance upon 
what they in fact were doing. There is no evidence that Her----· -· 
scovitz knew of the falsity of the representations. Instead, 
the evidence uniformly shows that Herscovitz did believe the 
statements, did rely on them, and took such action under the 
circumstances to protect Reliable as best he could. 
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POINT IV. 
THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO IMPOSE LIA-
BILITY UPON AMERICAN, WESTERN AND GAB FOR 
THE ACTIONS OF MR. DAY AND MR. BALL. 
The trial court made no findings in its judgment on the 
issue of agency or apparent authority. R-34-36. Respondents 
have now seized upon this in another attempt to bolster the 
judgment. 
As to Western, Jack Day was Vice President and half 
owner of that business. If he did not have authority, or ap-
' parent authority to speak and act for Western it is hard to 
visualize a fact situation where any person could bind a com-
pany. 
As to American, Jack Day (through Western) was the 
general agent of American in the State of Utah. A showing 
the principal did not authorize the particular act of the agent 
will not defeat recovery where, as here, the agent clearly has 
apparent or ostensible authority to represent the principal. 
Se Farrington vs Granite State Fire Ins., 120 U. 109, 232 
P.2d 754 (1951). 
Finally, the issues of liability to GAB are directed to 
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the cause of action in fraud for damage. Ball was the repre-
sentative of GAB in charge of the settlement of the inter-
ruption claim in the American policy. He was the person to 
negotiate the claim with Reliable, and the statement he made 
was clearly in the course of conducting his principal's busi-
ness, that of settling the claim of Reliable on the American 
policy. The other elements of fraud being present, the evi-
dence will support a jury verdict against GAB for the mis-
representations of Ball in the transaction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The arguments raised by the Respondent are, we submit, 
essentially arguments for the jury. There is, of course, evi-
dence Respondent can effectively use to support its position 
that Reliable, by endorsement of the check, released its claim 
against Respondents. But to so hold as a matter of law is 
to seize upon factor, the passage of 8 or 9 days 
time, and concentrate on that fact to the exclusion of all other 
evidence. 
The transaction must be viewed as a whole in the light 
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of circumstances then prevailing. As such, a jury could well 
find the settlement complained of was the direct result of the 
duress and fraudulent representations of defendants through 
their agents. 
A new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
2324 Adams A venue 
Ogden, Utah 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
9 
